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AGGREGATE EXPECTED CONSUMER SURPLUS AS A WELFARE 
INDEX WITH AN APPLICATION TO PRICE STABILIZATION 
BY WILLIAM P. ROGERSON' 
This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for the expected value of 
consumer surplus to correctly represent a consumer's preferences. A theorem characteriz- 
ing utility functions which represent preferences over conditional probabilities is used to 
derive this. An application to price stabilization policy is presented. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
SINCE THE 1940's, economists have used aggregate expected consumer surplus in 
order to examine the question of price stabilization [2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9]. 
Unfortunately, they have devoted little consideration to the assumptions under- 
lying its use. The implicit assumption seems to have been that the condition 
sufficient for consumer surplus to be a welfare measure in a world of certainty 
(constant marginal utility of income with respect to price in the relevant market on 
the part of all individuals) is also sufficient for expected consumer surplus to be a 
welfare measure in a world of risk. This paper shows that this assumption is untrue 
in general. 
Fortunately for researchers in applied fields, especially for those in agricultural 
economics, the assumption is true for the case where all the stochastic variation in 
prices originates from the supply side of the market. However, if variation in 
prices also originates from the demand side, then additional assumptions are 
required. What is particularly unfortunate is that in some cases of demand induced 
stochastic price variation, these assumptions are inconsistent with the ability of 
stochastic price variation to originate from the demand side in the first place. 
2. ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
Consider an economy with m goods, one firm, and n consumers. Adopting a 
partial equilibrium view of market one, assume that prices of other goods, {P1}7l2, 
are exogenous random variables. As well, assume the existence of a random 
variable, V, which affects supply of good one, and n random variables, { Wi}jj, Wi 
affecting the ith consumer's preferences over goods. Finally, assume that the 
income of the ith consumer, Mi, is also a random variable. Large case letters will 
always be used to denote random variables, while the smaller case of the same 
letter will denote a particular realization of the random variable. 
1 This paper was written when I was supported by National Science Foundation Grant Number 
S.O.C. 77-08573 to Robert H. Bates. I would like to acknowledge the extremely helpful assistance 
rendered me in writing this paper by Robert H. Bates, Robert Forsythe, Roger Noll, James Quirk, 
Louis Wilde, and two anonymous referees. 
2 Readers unfamiliar with the literature might refer to Massel [2] or Turnovsky [6, 7]. 
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The following notation can now be introduced: 
xij: amount of good j consumed by consumer i. 
Mi: income of consumer i. 
Ui(xil,... i , Xin,we): utility function of the ith consumer which is compatible with 
the expected utility hypothesis. 
dij(p, ... I Pm, mi, w): demand function for the jth good by the ith consumer. 
gi(Pi, . . ., Pmi, wi): indirect utility function of the ith consumer. 
di: equals In 1 dij. 
Ki(pl, . . , Pm, mi, w): marginal utility of income function for the ith coinsumer. 
si(pl* . I Pm, v): supply funtion of the jth good. 
M: the vector (M1, . . . , Mn). 
W: the vector (W1, . . ., Wn). 
P: the vector (P2,... , Pn). 
m: the vector (ml, . . ., mn). 
w: the vector (w1, . . ., Wn) 
p: the vector (P2, . . ., Pn) 
Note in particular that P and p are vectors of prices excluding price of the first 
good. 
Equality of supply and demand in market one determines the price in this 
market. Since the demand and supply for good one are affected by the above 
2n + m random variables, the price of good one is a function of these random 
variables and is thus itself a random variable. That is, price in market one is 
determined by 
di(pi, p, m, w) = si(pi, p, v). 
Given the usual assumptions,3 the implicit function theorem implies the existence 
of a function X, defined implicitly by the above, 
Pi = 9(p, m, w, v). 
We can compare this case to the case where government can enter the market 
by buying and selling so as to stabilize Pt at some constant, p*. This price is chosen 
so that government will buy and sell equal amounts over the long run and thus 
hold on average "zero" buffer stocks. The first case, that of no government 
interference, involves Pi being a random variable determined by 9. The second 
3Assume that: (i) d1 and s1 are defined and have continuous first derivatives for positive prices and 
incomes and for the ranges of W and V; (ii) for every positive (p, m) and every (w, v) in the range of 
(W, V), there exists a unique positive Pi which satisfies 
d, = sl; 
(iii) when evaluated at the points described in (ii), 
Dd1 Ds, 
Dpl Dpl 
That is, we simply assume that demand and supply are continuously differentiable, always intersect 
once and only once and never have the same slope at the point where they intersect. This last 
assumption can of course be guaranteed by assuming that demand slopes downward and supply slopes 
upward. 
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case, that of government stabilization, involves pi being constant at p*. More 
generally, if we allowed government the policy option of only partially stabilizing 
prices, the second case would involve pi being a random variable determined by 
qf(P, W, V, M) where f is some function. 
3. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR AGGREGATE EXPECTED 
CONSUMER SURPLUS TO BE A PARETO WELFARE MEASURE 
Consider the general situation where the set of all possible states of the world is 
n and there are n individuals with preferences over n2. The ith individual's 
preferences are represented by the real valued function yi defined on n2. That is, 
for x, y and n2, we have x preferred by individual i to y if and only if yi(x) > y1i(y). 
Notions of social welfare almost inevitably involve interpersonal comparisons; 
there are some losers and winners. Certainly, however, a minimum requirement 
for any real valued function over n2 purported to represent social welfare is that it 
be consistent with the Pareto criterion. That is, the index should rank one state as 
being better (worse) than another if all individuals evaluate4 it as being no worse 
(better) and at least one individual evaluates it as being better (worse). 
DEFINITION: Let A c n2. Then a real valued function on n is called Pareto on A 
if it is consistent with the Pareto criterion over A. 
In our case n can be viewed as all probability distribution functions over 
R +" xR" x R +n-. The distribution functions correspond to random vectors 
(P1, P, W, M). The individuals' preferences are of course represented by the 
functionals which assign the expected value of gi under F to the distribution F. Let 
G be any distribution function over the last 3n- 1 coordinates of R + x R x 
R +". Then let nG be the set of all elements of 2 having marginal distribution G 
over the last 3n -1 coordinates. We need a social welfare index to compare 
elements of n within the same nG. P, W, and M are fixed random variables. We 
compare the results of having P1 be qS(P, W, M, V) to P1 being fl(P, W, M, V). 
That is, for fixed exogenous behavior of other prices, we compare the alternatives 
of having P1 be the random variable generated by market forces or of having P1 be 
some other random variable generated by government action. Therefore, any 
welfare index we use to make our decision should be Pareto over 2G for every G.5 
Cast in these terms, we want to know if the expected value of aggregate 
consumer surplus is Pareto over 2G for every G. The question is best answered by 
first considering the individual. Let E be the expected value operation, ECi be the 
expected value of consumer surplus for individual i viewed as a function from 2 to 
R, and EC be the expected value of aggregate consumer surplus. We will call a 
distribution function constant if it assigns a probability of one to a single point. A 
distribution function will be called constant over a subset of the variables it is 
4 The evaluation is of course carried out using the individuals' utility functions. 5 Although G is fixed, the welfare index should work for any fixed G. 
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defined over if the relevant marginal distribution function is constant. Consider 
the whole class of distributions over all but the first coordinate of R +' x R ' x 
R +'. These are interpreted as distributions for the random vector (P, W, M). For 
any S, a subset of {P2,..., Pn W1 ... Wm, Min ... mn, we can select out the 
distribution functions which are constant for this subset. Let As be these dis- 
tributions. We can now state the theorem concerning individuals. 
THEOREM 1: Fix any i E {1,... , n}. Fix any S C {P2,.. . ., Pn Wi, mi}. Then Iand 
II are equivalent: 
I. ECi represents consumer i's preferences over nG for every G in As. 
II. (i) a8i/a1 = 0; (ii) aS/dapy = 0 if pi is not in S; (iii) a3i/awi = 0 if wi is not 
in S; (iv) a5i/ami = 0 if mi is not in S. 
PROOF: Only II => I will be proved here. The reverse is more difficult and is left 
to the Appendix. 
Let F1 and F2 be any two elements of f2G for some G in as. We want to show 
that using expected consumer surplus to compare F1 and F2 gives the same result 
as using expected utility. The latter, by definition, represents the ith consumer's 
preferences. 
ECi (Fl) 'c ECi (F2) 
rJJdi, (z, P wi, mi) dz dF1c ZZ di, (z, p, wi, mi) dz dF2 
J (gi(Pi, p, wi, mi) - gi (o, p, wi, mi)) dF 
5i(Pi, p, wi, mi) 
2{gi (Pi, P, Wi, mi) -gi (0, P, Wi, mi)0 dF2 
J~~~S (PAi(,P, Wi, mi) }2 
This last step is by Roy's duality theorem. See Quirk [4, p. 55] for a derivation. 
Now for each argument of Si, either 5i is constant with respect to it because the 
derivative of 8i with respect to it is zero or both F1 and F2 have constant marginals 
for the variable. Therefore by evaluating ci at the points of probability one and 
calling this number 35*, we have 
ECi (Fl) c ~:_ECi (F2) 
X j'* J (gi (pi, p, wi, mi) -gi (oo, p, wi, mi)) dF 
c- J* I (gPi, p, wi, mi) - giX, i W p, p, wi, mi ) dF2 
< 1 gi (p1, p, wi, mi) dF1 >, gi (p1, p, wi, mi) dF2 
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The second to the last step is possible because the marginals of F1 and F2 are the 
same over (p, wi, mi). The last step is possible because standard consumer theory 
predicts 8* is always positive. U 
The translation to sufficient conditions for aggregate expected consumer 
surplus to be Pareto over f2G for every G is now immediate. The question of 
necessary conditions is discussed in the Appendix. The sufficient conditions are, in 
a practical sense, "close" to being necessary. This should be kept in mind during 
the discussion in Section 4. 
THEOREM 2: Fix any S{P2,...., pPn W1 ... Win M ... mn}. Suppose the 
following hold for every i: (i) a&l/api = 0; (ii) a8/iap, = 0 if pi is not in S; (iii) 
a8i/awi = 0 if wi is not in S; (iv) a5i/ami =0 if mi is not in S. 
Then EC is a Pareto welfare index over lG for every G in As. 
PROOF: Let F1 and F2 be elements of f2G for some G. Then 
EC(F1) c EC(F2) 
<>J (| di1(z, p, wi, mi) dz) dF 
c J (fl~ E di1(z, p, wi, mi) dz) dF2 
X A dig(z, p, wi, mi) dZ dF1 
'c E| (|di, (z, p, wi, mi) dz dF2 
X E a* gi (pi, p,wi, mi) dFi 
n 1 
, _~1 A I gi(pi, p, wi, mi) dF2 
This last step uses the results in Theorem 1. Therefore, within a given f2G, EC 
operates like a positive weighted sum of the individual utility indexes. A function 
of this type is, of course, Pareto. U 
4. INTERPRETATION 
Theorem 1 states that a necessary and sufficient condition for expected 
consumer surplus to represent a consumer's preferences over changes in the 
random variable P1 is that the marginal utility of income be constant not only with 
respect to P1 but also with respect to any other factor which is a random variable. 
Theorem 2 points out that if this condition is satisfied for every consumer, then 
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aggregate expected consumer surplus is merely a positive weighted sum of 
individual expected consumer surplus. Therefore, aggregate expected surplus is 
Pareto. 
The simplest case is that where V is the only random element; P, W, and M are 
all constant. In terms of the supply and demand curves for market one, the supply 
curve is shifting but demand is stationary. In this case, the sufficient condition for 
EC to be a Pareto measure is that every consumer's marginal utility of income be 
constant with respect to P1. This is, of course, the condition for the case of 
certainty as well. Therefore, if all stochastic variation originates from the supply 
curve, the condition sufficient for aggregate consumer surplus to be Pareto in a 
riskless world is also sufficient for EC to be Pareto in a world of risk. 
Two particular cases of demand induced stochastic variation can be shown to 
never satisfy the sufficient conditions for EC to be Pareto. First is the case where 
fluctuations in income cause demand to shift.6 In this case, the sufficient conditions 
for EC to be Pareto imply that income changes could not produce demand 
changes. That is, observation of income induced demand shifts in and of itself 
constitutes evidence that the sufficient conditions cannot hold. In principle, 
therefore, aggregate expected consumer surplus cannot be used as a welfare 
measure for cases of income induced stochastic price variation. This argument is 
proved in Theorem 3. 
THEOREM 3: If a8i/ami =0 and a3i/ap, = 0, then adila/mi = 0. 
PROOF: We prove the contrapositive. From Roy's duality theorem (dropping 
the subscript i for consumer i), 
-ag -ag 
d a = aP 
ag 3 
am 
Differentiate both sides with respect to m, which yields 
a2g =-da ~d 
ap1am am am 
The result now follows immediately. U 
The same type of problem arises for a special case where W is random. If W1 
affects the consumer's marginal utility with respect to the jth good, then the 
consumer's demand for xi will vary randomly as a function of Wi. As a 
consequence, if we assume that a2ui/awiaxWi is unequal to zero for some i, we 
6 If just consumer i's income is shifting we might not expect this to cause a significant shift of 
aggregate demand. Therefore the following discussion is most relevant in a case where all consumers 
incomes are varying together, possibly due to the business cycle. 
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should also allow pi to be a nonconstant random variable.7 In this situation, if W 
affects each marginal utility in the same direction (a2uil/widxii is nonnegative 
for every j or is nonpositive for every j), then the sufficient conditions for EC to be 
a Pareto measure cannot occur. The following proof of this fact will also make 
clear that in the general case, the assumption that a8i/awi =0 amounts to a 
restriction of the vector 
2 gi agi 
awiaPl" 'a ' wiaPn 
to a particular hyperplane in R . Only very special cases of W affecting utility are 
thus consistent with the sufficient conditions for EC to be a correct measure. 
THEOREM 4: If Ui =fi(xil, . ., Xin, Wi) and 
a2Ui 
a2Ui <0 forj=1,...,l, 
aWiaxij 
=0 for j=+1,..., n, 
or 
a2ui 
aui >0 forj=1,...,l, 
OWiOXij 
=0 forj=l+l,...,n; 
then 
aSi a0 
-=0 >- for somej = 1,..., . 
awi api 
PROOF: By totally differentiating the first order conditions we obtain (dropping 
the subscript i for consumer i) 
dx\ I/ -A dp1 - ulw dw 
(Aii) 
dxn 
-AI -A dpn- nw dw 
dA, / -in, Xi dpi + dm, 
where 
/U11 ... Uln pl 
A= 
Unl . . Unn Pn 
Pl .. Pn 0/ 
7 That is, we use a general equilibrium argument to infer what partial equilibrium situations are 
plausible. 
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and Aii is the ijth cofactor of A, -A is the marginal utility of income, and 
uiw = a2u/adwxi. Now suppose DA/Dpi =0 Vj = 1,... 1. Then 
aA 
0=- 
api 
Ai,n+l An+l,n+l 
=-A -xj IAI 
Therefore 
Aj,n+1/|AI has the same sign for every j = 1, ... . Now 
aA Aj,n+l 
aw i=j IAI UJw. 
Since the uiw also all have the same sign, aA/aw consists of the sum of a group of 
similarly signed nonzero elements. Therefore aA/aw 0 . 0 
5. AN EXAMPLE 
The following is an example of a one-consumer world where expected 
consumer surplus ranks the alternatives of stabilization vs. nonstabilization 
differently than does expected utility. The source of random variation is the price 
of good x and government is considering stabilizing the price of good y. Let the 
consumer's utility function be 
u(x, y) = 2y1/2 + x, 
with corresponding indirect utility function, 
2 
g(px, P, m)=Px +mpy 
PxPy 
Let /x be the random variable 
I 
= 
1, with probability .7, 
x 4, with probability .3, 
and let the supply curve for y be 
2 
S=py. 
The price of good y determined by supply and demand equilibriating is then 
The buffer stock price, p*, of good y is that price which makes the expected value 
430 
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of government purchases, b, zero: 
E(b) = 0 >E(2_ -p2y) = 0 =0 
E(92x) 2 
=> 2 
-y0 2 2y 
p y 
We now need to calculate four numbers: the expected utility from each policy 
and the expected consumer surplus from each policy. 
Expected Utility From Stabilization: 
= 9 + m E()P 
Eg(Ax, p*) =E x 
9x y 
E(Ax) + 
- __+mEI- 
Expected Utility from No Stabilization: 
m92 4 
=E(IPx) + mE() 
Expected Consumer Surplus from Stabilization: 
0 92 
EC(PPX, p*) E x dp) 
*?y Py 
.oo g2 
=E x 
- 
xdpE 
py 4 
pxP 
EC 9, y)  E- dpyX/ ) 
9, py 
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Therefore the gains from stabilization according to the expected utility index are 
E(9 E () 9x) 
Substituting in yields the answer -.0593. The expected utility criterion thus says 
that government should not stabilize prices. The gains from stabilization accord- 
ing to the expected consumer surplus index are 
[E(92 )]3/4 _ E(93/2 ) 
Substituting in yields +.4914. The expected consumer surplus index thus says that 
government should stabilize prices, which contradicts the conclusion drawn from 
the expected utility index. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The use of aggregate expected consumer surplus to analyze the welfare 
implications of stochastic price variation requires no assumptions other than those 
that are required for the use of this method under conditions of certainty provided 
that the source of price variation lies solely in the supply curve of the problem. In 
the case of demand side variation, however, consumer surplus yields an ordering 
consistent with the Pareto criterion only when further assumptions are made. If 
variation in other prices causes demand side variation, then it is sufficient to 
additionally assume that the marginal utilities of income of all consumers be 
constant with respect to these prices. If variations in natural events such as rainfall 
or sunshine cause demand variation by directly affecting utility, the additional 
sufficient assumption amounts to a very restrictive condition on the nature of the 
effect on preferences. Finally, in the case where random variation of income 
induces stochastic demand variation, observation of this phenomena in and of 
itself constitutes evidence that the sufficient conditions for EC to be a correct 
measure cannot occur. 
In general, therefore, it seems that aggregate expected consumer surplus is most 
useful when stochastic variation results primarily from the supply side and does 
not significantly affect prices of other goods either indirectly through general 
equilibrium effects or directly through affecting supply curves of related markets. 
California Institute of Technology 
Manuscript received April, 1978; revision received April, 1979. 
APPENDIX 
The main purpose of this appendix is to derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a function 
over Rn to represent a consumer's preferences over density functions over Rn when comparisons 
between density functions are restricted to those where the density functions have the same marginal 
distributions with respect to the last t variables. As a corollary, we will have a necessary and sufficient 
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condition for expected consumer surplus to represent a consumer's preferences between price 
stabilization policies. Furthermore, we will be able to discuss the correctness of aggregate expected 
consumer surplus in similar situations. 
First, some notation and definitions must be introduced. Let Z = Rs+t, X = Rs, and Y = Rt. Call l2 
the set of all density functions on Z. Allow n to include discrete random variables (or mixtures of 
discrete and continuous random variables) by interpreting integration as summation when necessary. 
Call f2g the set of all elements of l2 with marginal distribution g over Y. For any real valued 
measurable function u on Z and f E (2, define Eu (f) by 
Eu(f) = J u(x, y)f(x, y) dx dy. 
Consider any relation S on l2. We will say u represents S on n2 if 
Eu(fi) < Eu(f2) iff f1 Q f2 
for every fl, f2 E (2. Representation over f2g is defined in an analogous fashion. 
The content of the expected utility theorem8 is that we can make a number of assumptions about S 
which allow us to conclude that there is a real valued function u over Z which represents s. 
Furthermore, for any other real valued function, u*, on Z, u* represents S if and only if u* = au + b, 
where a and b are constants and a > 0. We are interested in finding necessary and sufficient conditions 
for u* to represent S on f2g for every g. This is a weaker requirement than representing S on l2. In the 
former u*only has to be correct when comparing density functions with the same marginal dis- 
tributions. In the latter, u * has to be correct when comparing any two density functions. Therefore we 
expect a somewhat weaker necessary and sufficient conditions than u = au + b where a > 0 to emerge. 
Two definitions are needed to state the theorem. For y E Y, we call the fiber of y the set X x y. For two 
elements yo and Yi of Y, we say that there is a preference reversal between the fibers of yo and Yi if 
there are two density functions f and f" over x such that (ff, yo) <(f', yo) and (f", yl) < (f', yl) where 
one of the < signs may be S . The ordered pair (f, y) denotes the density function with marginal density 
f over x and discrete marginal density of y with probability 1 over Y. A preference reversal between 
two fibers simply means that the consumer's preferences between two densities over x depend on what 
value of Y he receives. 
THEOREM 5: Let S be a relation over n2 and let u be a real valued function representing . Then for 
any measurable real valued function u* defined on Z, the following three statements are equivalent. 
I. u* represents S over n2g for every g. 
II. u*(x, y) = a (y) - u (x, y) + b(y) where: (i) a (y) > O for every y; (ii) a (yo) = a (y1) if there is a 
preference reversal between the fibers of yo and Yi for any yo and Yi in Y. 
III. u*(x, y)=a(y) * u(x, y)+b(y) where: (i)a(y)>Oforeveryy;(ii)a (y) is constant over Yif there is 
one instance of a preference reversal between two fibres. 
PROOF: II a III: Suppose there is at least one instance of a preference reversal between the fibers 
of two points yo and y1. Then a(yo) = a(y1). Consider any point y E Y. There must be a preference 
reversal between y and one of yo and y1. Therefore a(y) = a(yo) = a(y 1. 
III I: 
Eu*( fi) 9 Eu*( f2) 
< u*(x, y)fi(x, y) dx dy < | u*(x, y)f2(x, y) dx dy 
<* a(y)u(x, y)fi(x, y) dx dy -'- a(y)u(x, y)f2(x, y) dx dy 
(because b is not a function of x and the marginal distributions of fi and f2 with respect to y are the 
same). 
(*) a (y)c1(y)g(y) dy | a (y)c2(y)g(y) dy, 
where ci(y) is the conditional expectation of u(x, y) using fi(x, y). Now if c1(y) - c2(y) for every y we 
know that since a (y) > 0 that in fact * is equivalent to 
(**) J c1(y)g(y) dy ' J C2(Y)g(y) dy. 
8 See De Groot [1] for a treatment of the expected utility theorem. 
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Similarly if c1(y) s c2(y) for every y, we know (*) is equivalent to (**). However, (**) is equivalent to 
Eu(fi) Eu(f2) 
and we are done. This leaves the case where there are y', y" Y such that 
cl(y')> c2(y') 
and 
c2(y")>c1(y"), 
where one of the inequalities need not be strict. However, this is precisely the condition for there to be 
a preference reversal between the fibers of y' and y". Therefore a(y) is constant on Y. It is now clear 
that (*) is once again equivalent to (**). 
I =II: PartI: First we will show that u*(x, y) = a(y)u(x, y) + b(y) where a(y)> 0 for every y. This is 
because, by assumption, for any fixed y, u*, and u both represent the same order of density functions 
over x. Therefore, for a fixed y 
u*(x, y)= au(x, y)+b 
where a > 0, by the regular expected utility theorem. When y varies, then a and b depend on it in 
general. 
Part II: We now show that if there is a preference reversal between the fibers of yl and Y2 that 
a(yi) = a(y2). 
Suppose, for contradiction, that there are points yl, Y2 in Y such that there is a preference reversal 
between their fibers but a(yl)  a(y2). Since there is a preference reversal we know there are density 
functions f' and f' on x such that 
(f', Yi)> (f", Yi) 
and 
(f", Y2)> (f', Y2), 
where one of the inequalities need not be strict. 
Now the procedure will be to construct two density functions over Z by taking a convex combination 
of y, and Y2 and pairing it alternately with f' and f'. It will be shown that u ranks the two densities as 
equal yet u* ranks one as preferred to the other. Then we are done for u and u* cannot represent the 
same order over f2g where g is the convex combination of Yi and Y2, which is a contradiction. To do 
this, let yli + (1 - 6)y2 denote the density function over Y: 
Y1 + (1- 8)Y2 = { Yl with probability 8, 
Y2 with probability (1 - 8). 
Our two density functions over Z are then (f', 8y+(1 -8)y2) and (f', 8y +(1 - 8)Y2) where the 
marginals are independent. Now we choose 8 so u is indifferent between them. That is, we solve 
8Eu(f', yl)+ (1- 8)Eu(f', y2) - Eu(f", yl)-(1- 8)Eu(f', Y2) = 0. 
This yields 
Eu(f", y2)-Eu(f', Y2) 
(Eu(f', y2)-Eu(f', y2)) + (Eu(f', y)-Eu(f', Yi)) 
But by the preference reversal assumption, it is clear that 8 E (0, 1). As well, since a(y1) : a(y2), it is 
easy to see that 
8Eu*(f, yl) + (1 - )Eu*(f, Y2) - SEu*(f, y) - (1 - 8)Eu*(f', Y2) O. 
Therefore we have constructed the desired density functions and are done. U 
Suppose that there are a number of preference relations i corresponding to different consumers. It 
is clear that a sufficient condition for the aggregate index E(Xu* (x, y)) to be Pareto9 on f2g for every g 
9 Recall this term was defined on page 425. 
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is that u* represent i on !2g for every g and i. In this case E(Xi u* (x, y)) is equivalent to 
E(Xi ui(x, y)), which is obviously Pareto since it is a positive weighted sum of expected utilities. It is not 
strictly necessary that u* represent i on f2g for every i and g in order for E(Xi u* (x, y)) to be Pareto 
on every i2g, however. For example, suppose that Eu* and Eui agree on all pairs of density functions 
in which one Pareto dominates the other and both are in the same Q2g. Then it is fairly easy to prove that 
E(i u* (x, y)) is Pareto on !2g for every g even though u* does not necessarily represent -i on !2g 
for any i or g. The extreme case of this is where no distribution dominates another one. Then every 
index on the space is Pareto. 
However, there are definitely collections of preferences in which it is necessary for u* to represent 
s, on !2g for every i and g in order for E(Xi u* (x, y)) to be Pareto (the case where all consumers are 
identical). Therefore if we want to specify a method for constructing an aggregate welfare index of the 
form E(Xi u* (x, y)) which will yield a Pareto welfare index on f2g when applied to all possible 
collections of preferences, it is necessary that each u* represent s on each Q2g. As a practical matter 
then, the preference representation condition is also necessary. This will remain so until someone 
demonstrates that there is a broad class of economies (containing all the ones we are likely to run 
across) in which it is not necessary. 
We can now apply this theory to our case of interest. The subscript i for consumer i will be dropped 
until we discuss aggregate consumer surplus. We let Z represent prices with X representing Pi and Y 
representing P2 through p,. The utility function representing S is the consumer's indirect utility 
function, 
g(p ...* Pn ); 
For this interpretation I will assume income remains constant and events such as rainfall do not directly 
affect utility, for notational simplicity, although they can easily be included as part of Y 
Note that the existence of a preference reversal on two fibers now can be interpreted as an instance 
of nonneutrality of risk with respect to changes in P2 through Pn. If only the expected value of Pi 
mattered to the consumer we would expect the random variable with the lower expected value to be 
chosen on any fiber. No preference reversals would then occur. However, if other aspects of the 
distribution counted, then there would be a possibility for preference reversals. For example, suppose 
Pi and p' have the same expected value but p' has a higher variance. When P2 through Pn are 
extremely low the consumer might then possess enough extra income to prefer a gamble and select p'1 
over Pli However at higher prices of P2 through Pn he might prefer the alternative with less risk. 
Therefore a preference reversal consists of a case where the consumer's attitudes towards the higher 
moments of the distribution of Pi changed enough with changes in P2 through Pn to affect his choice. 
This is a very natural definition of being risk nonneutral with respect to changes in P2 through Pn, For 
the rest of this discussion I will assume that the consumer is not totally risk neutral with respect to P2 
through p,. This allows me to assume that a (y) in Theorem 5 is constant. 
Now, letting CS be the consumer surplus function on R", we can easily prove the following corollary 
from Theorem 5. The proof is unaltered if we allow more than one price to change and use line 
integrals. 
COROLLARY 5-a: Suppose the consumer is not totally risk neutral with respect to P2 through Pn. Then 
CS is a representation of S over Q2gfor every g if and only if the marginal utility of income is constant with 
respect to all prices. 
PROOF: CS is a representation of S over !2g for every g 
'- (P1,i.*,Pn) = a *-(Pi,. Pn), where a is some positive constant, 
ap, ap, 
X-i Xl(p P2, p * * Pn) dp =-a 6(P1., Pn) xl(pl* Pn) 
apl p 
where a is some positive constant, 
'X*-xl(pl, P2, . * *, Pn) = -a 8 (P., Pn)* xl(pl, * , Pn) 
where a is some positive constant, 
<a8i(pj...Pn) = 1 for some positive constant a, 
(Pl, * * , Pn) is a constant (8 is always positive). U 
WILLIAM P. ROGERSON 
This result is interesting in that it adds another separate reason for requiring that 8 be constant. 
Furthermore it places much stronger requirements on 8. Just considering CS as a utility index, we 
know that in the multivariable consumer surplus case (where more than one price is allowed to change) 
the integral used to calculate consumer surplus is path independent if and only if 8 is constant with 
respect to the prices which are changing.10 However, when only one price is allowed to change there is 
no such problem. In fact, if the demand curve slopes downward, consumer surplus is obviously a utility 
index for the consumer over fibers of P2 ... Pn. Both CS and g slope downward, so there is obviously a 
monotone transformation relating them regardless of whether or not 6 is fixed. However, Corollary 
5-a states that in the case where prices are all random variables, 8 must be constant even in the one 
variable case as well as in the multivatiate case. Furthermore, 8 must be constant with respect to every 
price which experiences stochastic variation, not merely with respect to those which are changed. 
We therefore know that a constant marginal utility of income with respect to prices that are random 
variables is sufficient for aggregate expected consumer surplus to be a Pareto welfare measure. 
Furthermore, it is also necessary to assume that the marginal utility of income is constant with respect 
to prices which are random variables if we want to guarantee that aggregate expected consumer surplus 
will work in all possible cases. The same comments apply to income and natural events if they vary 
randomly (and if, in the latter case, they directly enter the utility function). 
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